New firms in high-tech sectors contribute to innovation, competition, and employment growth, but positive externalities like knowledge spillovers can prevent entrepreneurs from appropriating the full returns from their investments. In addition, uncertainty and information asymmetry pose challenges for start-up financing. Public policy programs therefore aim to support new firms. This study evaluates the effects of participation in such programs on the performance of new high-tech firms founded in Germany between 2005 and 2012. Distinguishing between grants and subsidized loans and after matching recipient and non-recipient firms based on a broad set of founder and company characteristics, we find that grants are better suited than loans for increasing high-risk R&D investments, but only the receipt of both grants and loans improves innovation performance and reduces the likelihood of bankruptcy. Although grants and subsidized loans have little short-run effect on overall employment and revenue, we conclude that young firms benefit from grants without repayment obligation through financing of early stage R&D. Combined with subsidized loans, grants facilitate turning research results into marketable products via complementary investment in tangible assets. Finally, we find a crowding-in effect, rather than a crowding-out, of private venture capital.
Introduction
The impact of newly established firms on economic development has been of interest to scholars and policymakers for many years (e.g., Acs and Audretsch, 1988; Haltiwanger et al., 2013; Audretsch et al., 2016) . Innovative companies produce positive externalities that create social returns and knowledge spillovers facilitate follow-on innovations and their diffusion (Acs et al., 2009) . Previous research particularly stresses the role played by new technologybased firms for generating radical innovation and in exerting pressure to innovate on incumbents (Henderson, 1993; Schneider and Veugelers, 2010) .
Whereas the overall importance of new ventures is undisputed, research also points out challenges faced by entrepreneurs in establishing their business as well as substantial differences among new firms with regard to their innovation and growth potential (Czarnitzki and Delanote, 2013; Haltiwanger et al., 2013) .
Challenges for high-tech start-up financing arise from the incomplete appropriability of returns, the high investment demand and the intangibility of the outcomes from research and development (R&D) efforts. Limited financing, however, may result in unpursued innovation opportunities and lower start-up performance.
Public funding programs for new, potentially innovative, start-ups have consequently emerged in many countries (Storey and Tether, 1998) , with the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program in the US being the most prominent example (Lerner, 1999; Howell, 2017) .
The rationale behind such funding programs is that providing seed funding to new companies reduces the consequences of financial market frictions and compensates the entrepreneur for the social benefits his activities create. Typically, the processes for awarding funding in such programs are highly selective because of the need to identify the ventures with the highest potential for innovation. In addition, by focusing on certain technology areas, support can also be explicitly directed at technological fields which promise societal returns (Mazzucato, 2018) . However, it is not self-evident that these public support programs incentivize innovative entrepreneurship or help to enable entrepreneurial innovation. Despite support programs in place, Decker et al. (2016) report a decline in young high-growth firms for the US in the post-2000 period, a development that can also be observed in continental Europe during the 2008-2014 period (EFI -Commission of Experts for Research and Innovation, 2017) . In addition, sceptics of public support programs argue that public funding may crowd out financing from private investors. For the case of public venture capital there is indeed some evidence that it crowds out private venture capital (Leleux and Surlemont, 2003; Cumming and MacIntosh, 2006) and that it is minimally effective in supporting high-tech start-ups' growth (Grilli and Murtinu, 2014) .
Whereas the literature that evaluates innovation-support policies for established companies concludes that treatment effects are highly heterogeneous with regard to the size of the recipient firms and that the effects depend on the nature of the sponsored project (e.g., Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento, 2014; Hottenrott et al., 2017; Nilsen et al., 2018) , few studies investigate support specifically targeted towards new firms. The few studies that do look at the role played by public non-venture-capital types of support generally conclude that these programs foster performance. Lerner (1999) and, more recently, Howell (2017) study the effects of SBIR grants and find that recipients perform better in attracting follow-on financing and outperform others in terms of innovation success. Colombo et al. (2012) , Grilli and Murtinu (2012) and Colombo et al. (2013) show for a sample of Italian new-technology ventures that subsidies have a positive impact on R&D spending and employment. These results suggest that the programs do indeed reach firms that are constrained below their optimal investment level.
Most recently, Conti (2018) finds for an Israeli support program that the design of the program matters for its effectiveness. More precisely, restrictions on transferring know-how away from a given geographic region undermined the value of program participation. The abolishment of these restrictions increased program benefits in terms of start-up survival, ventures' ability to attract external investment and innovation performance.
Despite these insights, we still know little about the role of support instrument design for program effectiveness and whether different types of policy measures substitute or complement each other. In addition to grants, subsidized loans constitute a popular policy tool. In the US for instance, the Department of Energy provides subsidized loans for clean energy projects or Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing (ATVM) through its Loans Program Office (LPO). Likewise, in Germany or in the UK, start-up loans with conditions in terms of fees, interest payments, and required securities that are more favorable than those of standard loans (e.g., the KfW-ERP Start-up Loan or the British Business Bank's Start-up Loans), are popular besides grant-based support. In several other countries, such as Canada, France, Finland and Israel, support programs including those for start-ups have a grant-based design, but in case of commercial success grant recipients must pay back the initial amount. This makes these grants comparable to a low interest rate loan for which the failure risk is borne by the public funding agency (Conti, 2018) . Although debt-based support instruments play an important role in practice, we still know very little about the effects of this type of instrument on enabling innovation efforts and start-up performance.
This study contributes to previous research on the effectiveness of public start-up support by differentiating between grants and subsidized loans for new high-tech firms and by investigating their impact on a broad range of outcomes: R&D investment, employment, capital investment, and innovation success. We furthermore test the crowding-out hypothesis with regard to venture capital funding and investigate possible effects on the probability of merging with another company or being acquired, as well as possible implications for business failure.
We derive expectations regarding the effects of public support from grants and loans based on a simple model of financing constraints that goes back to Howe and McFetridge (1976) and Hall (2002) . The model's main prediction is that the repayment obligations attached to loans may result in little effects on R&D investments, while with grants the loss in case of failure is limited to the lost opportunity costs of having used the grant for a failed idea.
However, loans may increase investments in complementary tangible assets that are necessary to bring new products to the market and to implement process innovations.
To test these predictions, we estimate treatment effects models that account for the selectivity of these support instruments for a large sample of new high-tech ventures in Germany founded between 2005 and 2012. Results suggest that grants, but not subsidized loans, lead to additional R&D spending and R&D employment. However, when start-ups receive subsidized loans along with grants, they are more likely to introduce a product or service that is new to the market. Comparing recipients of both types of support to those that only receive grants shows that this is because of investments in complementary tangible assets. The finding that loans complement grants extends findings by Huergo and Moreno (2017) , who study the effects of R&D subsidies in a sample of established Spanish companies, to the context of newly founded firms. Finally, the results suggest a crowding-in, rather than a crowding-out, of venture capital for grant recipients and a reduced bankruptcy risk for beneficiaries of both types of support.
These results have implications for innovation policy as they confirm the concern that innovation efforts in new technology-based firms are below the social optimum and that, by carrying part of the risk, public funding institutions may help to finance radical innovations that would not be pursued otherwise. However, the results also suggest that a policy mix that combines grants with loans is more effective than loans or grants alone in turning research outcomes into marketable innovations. Therefore, funding agencies may view both channels as essential parts of publicly funded business support rather than considering both policy instruments as substitutes. Finally, the result that public subsidies for new ventures increase the likelihood that a start-up can raise venture capital later in its life cycle, suggests that public subsidies may support ventures at stages when they are not yet attractive for external investors, thereby facilitating venture capital investments rather than substituting for them.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the research on high-tech financing and the role of subsidies and section 3 presents the theoretical framework that underlies our empirical study. Section 4 introduces the econometric identification strategy, section 5 presents the data, section 6 discusses the results, and Section 7 concludes.
High-tech start-up financing and the role of subsidies
In technology-driven industries, start-ups' business models typically build on scientists' and engineers' specific knowledge (Braguinsky et al., 2012) and the success of these ventures depends on their ability to finance the cutting-edge research that allows them to stay at the knowledge frontier. They also need to finance product and process development to turn research results into new products and services. Unlike established companies with incoming cash flow, the extent to which new companies can finance such R&D internally is limited. Moreover, the indivisibility of investment results in a large ratio between investment requirements and equity.
This implies that if the entrepreneur cannot or is not willing to provide all necessary funds from private assets, external financing is required (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989) .
The entrepreneurial finance literature has long stressed the challenges associated with external fundraising because of the uncertainty that R&D projects will yield usable results or eventually financial success. In addition, information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and capital providers are especially high in knowledge-intensive sectors (e.g., Carpenter and Petersen, 2002) . The complexity of these ventures' products and services often means that founders have far greater insight into the technology than the potential financier does, and the founders might not be willing to share their proprietary information for fear of imitators and larger competitors (Anton and Yao, 2002, 2004; Hellmann and Perotti, 2011) . The unequally distributed information leaves external capital providers with two problems: a hiddeninformation problem because they cannot ex-ante fully assess the quality of the potential investment, and a hidden-action problem after the founder receives the capital.
To counteract these problems and attract capital, founders can pledge collateral to signal their quality (Bester, 1985; Berger and Udell, 1990; Boot et al., 1991) and ensure that they do not engage in opportunistic behavior after receiving funding (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Elitzur and Gavious, 2003) . However, young technology firms' ability to provide collateral is typically limited, as much of their assets are intangible and company-specific. Therefore, asset specificity, that is, "the degree to which an asset can be redeployed by alternative uses or alternative users without sacrificing productive value" (Williamson, 1991, p. 281) , poses particular constraints on young high-tech firms. Since their highly specific assets lose value rapidly in case of bankruptcy, such assets are seldom considered suitable collateral (Berger and Udell, 1998; 2006) . Capital providers in the debt and equity markets face similar uncertainties, so new firms may suffer from financial constraints that negatively influence their investment decisions and hinder their ability to pursue risky R&D (Hubbard, 1998; Colombo et al., 2013) . For their part, debt providers are disadvantaged in coping with the uncertainties that come with high-tech venture financing because of the structure of debt contracts. Since creditors do not participate in the returns, interest payments are unlikely to compensate for the unbalanced risk-return profile (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Denis, 2004; Brown et al., 2012) . In addition, banks, by far the most important providers of debt, may lack monitoring processes that can equalize the information asymmetries. While investors in the equity capital market gain specific monitoring skills and knowledge when they specialize in certain industries or in certain of development stages (Norton and Tenenbaum, 1993) , banks typically show less specialization, have little say regarding the company's strategy decisions, and have no upside potential in terms of returns.
Carpenter and Petersen (2002) for start-ups in Germany that those that are active in high-tech sectors are less likely to use bank loans and that they face more difficulties in raising bank finance than low-tech start-ups do.
Although equity providers' business models do not tend to be as risk-averse, they still seem to avoid investments in R&D projects whose outcomes and commercial benefits are uncertain (Gompers, 1995) . In fact, Howell (2017) shows that new firms that have public funding in the form of SBIR grants attract venture-capital funding after the firms have gone beyond the default-prone prototyping stage. This result underscores the potential importance of public start-up support, particularly at the early stages of the life cycle.
To reduce financial constraints as a hindrance to the creation of radical innovation, employment, and hence economic growth, direct grant-based financial-support measures for high-tech ventures have become a popular policy instrument. To ease access to debt capital, government institutions take part of private lenders' credit default risk, thus improving the riskreturn profile for lenders and providing below-market interest rates through subsidized loans.
While there are several comprehensive reviews of the literature on the impact of subsidies' on R&D activities more generally (e.g., David et al., 2000; Cerulli, 2010; Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014) , insights on public support for young, high-tech companies are still scarce. Colombo et al. (2013) , Colombo et al. (2012) , and Grilli and Murtinu (2012) , who focus on Italian technology-based new ventures, find a positive impact of subsidies on R&D inputs, measured by R&D expenditures and employment. Adding to these insights by looking at outcomes rather than inputs in nascent firms in the German region of Thuringia, Cantner and Kösters (2015) find that subsidies firms 2.8 times higher patent count and employment growth is 66 percent higher than in unsubsidized ones. Conti (2018) finds beneficial effects of program participation on survival, innovation and attraction of venture capital for a sample of Israeli an companies.
Moreover, little attention has been paid to factors that matter particularly for newly founded firms such as investment in production facilities, i.e. tangible assets, the market success of innovations, changes in ownership through equity investments and mergers and acquisitions, or bankruptcy. With regard to the policy instrument itself, studies either explicitly consider only grants, loan-like grants or do not differentiate between the types of funding. In principle, both grants and subsidized loans provide funding to overcome financial market frictions. As we discuss in the next section, however, grants and subsidized loans may not be equally effective in triggering high-risk R&D investments and innovation outcomes. Huergo and Moreno (2017) are the first to consider the differences between grants and loans in a unified framework and test for possible complementarities between these policy tools. Their study is based on a sample of established enterprises in which only about three percent of firms can be classified as startups, so that the following analyses aims to generalize of their findings to the context of newly founded firms.
Theoretical Framework
We build on the simple investment model initially presented by Howe and McFetridge (1976) , which was further developed by Hall (2002) and Hottenrott and Peters (2012) , to examine the effect of a grant or a subsidized loan on a high-tech firm's R&D investment decisions. R&D investment is typically considered the most important input to successful innovation, so it is of pivotal interest to policymakers.
We assume that a high-tech venture i has several innovative business or project ideas but lacks the internal capital to fund the necessary R&D efforts for all of them. Aware of this financial constraint, the venture ranks the ideas k according to their expected rate of return (RORk), deriving the RORk for each idea from the expected benefits (Bk), less implementation costs (Ck). The descending order of ideas results in a downward-sloping demand function for R&D financing of venture i (Di) that reflects venture i's marginal rate of return (MRRi), which depends on the level of R&D investment (Ii) and venture and industry characteristics (Xi) like human capital and the technological opportunities in a sector:
Assuming that the firm follows a profit-maximizing strategy, it invests in R&D until the MRRi equals the marginal cost of capital (MCCi) needed to finance this amount of R&D. The MCCi depends on Ii, the amount of internal funds (IFi) available, creditworthiness (Wi), and the opportunity costs of the invested capital (Ri):
Pecking order theory suggests that high-tech ventures exhaust internal sources of funds before they attempt to finance R&D externally (Myers and Majluf, 1984) . Following Fazzari et al. (1988) , the marginal opportunity costs of internal funds (cint) are constant and the external capital supply curve is upward-sloping because of capital market imperfections. The slope of the capital supply curve increases with the gap between internal and external sources of financing. As discussed in the previous section, in the setting of new high-tech companies, information asymmetries between the venture and external capital providers are likely to be high because of the complexity of the business activity, the risk associated with new technologies, and the comparatively high probability of default. Creditworthiness is often low because of the firms' limited internal funds and a lack of re-deployable tangible assets with which to secure loans. Therefore, we expect the slope to be steep or approaching vertical. 
.
- Figure 1 about here -
The effects of grants versus subsidized loans
We use this simple model to derive expectations regarding the effects of grants and subsidized loans on R&D spending. The fundamental difference between the two support measures in their pure forms is that grants do not come with repayment obligations and subsidized loans do, although the capital from both grants and loans has opportunity costs related to investing the respective amount in R&D rather than into something else. A grant's impact can be illustrated and interpreted as an extension of internal funds ( Figure 2 ). Ii * ' represents the R&D investment that is possible after the receipt of a grant.
In contrast to grants, subsidized loans affect the slope of the external capital supply curve. A public institution taking over the risk that is inherent to every subsidized loan increases . If the shift is large enough, subsidized loans would lead, like grants, to higher R&D investments.
However, these considerations are still incomplete, as we must take into account that R&D efforts may fail, in which case benefits ( ) approach zero. Therefore, an entrepreneur will assess an R&D idea's RORk by taking into account the possibility of failure (occurring with probability 1-p, with p the probability of success). If an internally funded or grant-funded idea fails, the maximum loss equals the project's Ck, but once it is financed by debt, the entrepreneur has more "skin in the game" since he or she must repay the loan or lose its collateral. This repayment obligation (RPO) is assumed to prevail at least in part even if the loan was backed by a government institution (Huergo and Moreno, 2017) . The RPO would reduce to zero only if the start-up files for bankruptcy, that is, if project failure leads to failure of the entire business.
Therefore, the entrepreneur will incorporate this additional risk component ex-ante and lower the project's RORk (Figure 4 ).
Based on equations (4) and (5), we can show that, for any p < 1 and any RPO > 0 for a given project idea with characteristics > and Ck, we will obtain > . If the difference in the ROR is sufficiently large, we expect that the R&D-stimulating effect is larger and that optimal R&D levels are higher for grants than it is for loans, ceteris paribus. For other types of tangible investments, for instance, those in production facilities, the default probability matters less because some of these assets may sold, taken over by the debtor or be redeployed and possess at least some value which can be used to reduce the RPO. Thus, we expect subsidized loans to facilitate additional tangible investments with lower value uncertainty.
-Figures 2, 3, and 4 about here -
The joint receipt of grants and subsidized loans and the nature of investment
In principle, firms can receive both types of subsidy simultaneously, in which case we assume that the investment volume is split between the two, reducing the repayment obligation that is associated with the loan. We also consider that grants may be used for certain kinds of projects, while loans are used for others. Given the relevance of the repayment obligation if the idea fails, loans may be used for less risky projects, that is, less for basic research and more for later-stage projects or even not for R&D projects at all. This consideration supports the hypothesis that subsidized loans may trigger less additional R&D investment than grants do. However, the receipt of both grants and loans may result in additional R&D spending initiated through the grants, as well as investment in complementary tangible assets initiated through the loans.
Therefore, we expect that this mix of policy instruments is more likely to facilitate the successful market introduction of an innovation than grants alone. Successful innovation may also generate sales and employment growth, reduce failure risk, and increase the probability of follow-on investments by venture capitalists. More innovative start-ups are also more likely to be targets for acquisitions by other companies (Henkel et al., 2015) .
Therefore, the following analysis considers, in addition to R&D activities, investment in tangible assets, innovation success, overall employment and sales as well as mergers & acquisitions, venture capital financing and bankruptcy as outcome measures potentially affected by the subsidy receipt.
Econometric method
The following analysis estimates the treatment effect of a subsidy on a set of outcome variables Y to determine whether and to what extent the subsidy impacts R&D investment, tangible investment, employment, revenues, innovation performance, and ownership. The average treatment effect on the treated can be written as:
where Yi T is the outcome of treated firms, and " ! # is the counterfactual situation-that is, the outcome that would have been realized if the treatment group (S=1) had not been treated. S & '0,1* is the receipt of a subsidy, and N T is the number of treated firms. We define three variants of S: the receipt of a grant, the receipt of a subsidized loan, and the simultaneous receipt of a grant and a subsidized loan.
The challenge of such an analysis is that " ! # cannot be observed, but it must be estimated. Taking the average value of untreated firms would lead to invalid conclusions because of the selectivity involved in distributing subsidies to start-ups. In other words, participants differ from non-participants in important characteristics that correlate with the outcome variables. The selection problem and the subsequent non-random composition of publically subsidized high-tech ventures must be considered with two possibilities in mind.
First, the pool of subsidized firms may consist of over-performing ventures, such as when the granting institution follows a picking-the-winners strategy (Cantner and Kösters, 2012) .
Second, the pool may consist of mainly underperforming ventures if the granting institution targets ventures with grave financial problems or ventures with high R&D potential self-select out because of other funding options, i.e. a backing-the-losers policy. Therefore, we use an econometric evaluation technique developed to address the estimation of treatment effects when the available observations of individuals or firms are subject to a potential selection bias (see Heckman et al., 1999; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009 ).
Established estimation strategies include the (conditional) difference-in-difference estimator, control function approaches (selection models), instrumental variable (IV) estimation, regression discontinuity designs, and non-parametric (matching) techniques that are based, for instance, on propensity scores (Athey and Imbens, 2017) . In the case of a new venture that receives the treatment early in its life cycle, the first category -exploring differences in differences before and after the treatment -cannot be used because of the lack of an ex-ante period for comparison (see Figure A. 2, which shows for the 2008-cohort that a large share of firms receive treatment in their first or second years of activity.). Control function approaches
and IV-models, on the other hand, require the identification of valid exclusion restrictions. In our case, such identification would require exogenous variables that explain the receipt of a subsidy but not the outcome variables R&D, employment, and innovation, which are notoriously difficult to find (Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2013) . Regression discontinuity designs require information about how the applicants for the support programs are evaluated, information that is often, as in our case, not available or not comparable across programs and rounds of funding. Moreover, funding agencies often avoid publishing rejected applicants' names to protect the firms from negative consequences.
Matching approaches have the advantage that they make no assumptions about the functional form or error distribution, so they have gained momentum in the recent policyevaluation literature (e.g., Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2013; Huergo and Moreno, 2017) .
Therefore, we adopt a variant of the propensity-score-matching approach to study the effects of program participation on a new venture's activities while taking into account the endogenous nature of public subsidies. However, for the matching estimator to be valid we have to build on the conditional independence assumption (CIA) introduced by Rubin (1977) ; that is, we have to observe all of the important determinants that drive a venture's selection by a program or at least have proxy variables for them. Then, after conditioning on a large set of venture and founder characteristics X, the setting comes close to an experimental design, and we have no a priori judgment about whether a firm receives or does not receive a treatment 1 . Based on the CIA, we can estimate the counterfactual situation for any outcome Y by using a matched group of non-subsidized firms that have similar characteristics in X:
In our case, we must either observe or proxy all characteristics that determine the venture's selection by the grant or subsidized loan program. Given the detailed survey data that provides a large set of founder and company characteristics, we are confident that our dataset provides sufficient information to conduct such an approach (see the next section for a detailed description of the dataset). Huergo and Trenado (2010) provide further support for the congruency of private and public funding criteria and the dependence of funding award on observable factors.
Rather than performing exact matching (EM), we construct a score based on the probability that a venture receives a treatment (obtained from a probit regression), conditional on a set of observable characteristics X. This propensity score is an index function that summarizes in a single number a wide set of observable characteristics that affect the probability that a venture receives a treatment. In particular, we use a variant of the nearest- See Lechner and Wunsch (2013) who show that the inclusion of a large set of appropriate control variables reduces bias in propensity score applications. loan the single closest venture (in terms of its propensity score) that did not receive a public subsidy while requiring that the selected observations in the control group are observed in the same year. To ensure the validity of the matching estimators, we check the overall homogeneity of the subsidized and non-subsidized groups by identifying the highest and lowest propensity scores in the non-subsidized groups and eliminating all observations from the two subsidized groups that have higher or lower propensity scores (i.e., we require "common support"). In addition, we incorporate a threshold to avoid bad matches, defining this threshold (caliper) as the maximum distance allowed between the propensity scores of a subsidized and a nonsubsidized high-tech venture. If the predefined distance is exceeded, we delete the subsidized observation from Lechner and Wunsch (2013) our sample (see Smith and Todd (2005) and Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2013) for a similar approach). As argued by Lechner and Wunsch (2013) this approach has the advantage to reduce not only differences in observable characteristics between groups, but is also likely to reduce differences in unobservable by discarding very dissimilar firms from the respective control group.
Finally, we incorporate elements of EM by requiring the matched firms to be in the same region (East Germany or West Germany), and we match R&D-active firms only with other firms that have the same activity status.
After the matching process, we calculate the unbiased treatment effect in each outcome Y as:
We test the validity of the estimator by comparing differences in all variables X after matching and account for the sensitivity of the mean comparison to skewed distributions of the outcome variables (particularly R&D expenditures, investment, employment and turnover) by considering logged versions of Y and intensities (ratios). The KfW Bankengruppe is Germany's largest state-owned promotional bank.
Data and variables

3
Creditreform is Germany's largest credit rating agency.
4
Excluded sectors are agriculture, electricity, gas and water supply, health care, mining and quarrying, and the de-mergers (spin-offs) and subsidiaries of other firms. This exclusion is an important strength in our research context, as non-independent firms may reflect the R&D activities of the related institution (see Fryges et al. (2010) for a more detailed description of the data set). 
Treatment variables
The data includes yearly information on whether the high-tech ventures received a grant, a subsidized loan, or both. Overall, 839 of the 2346 firms received a subsidy of some form at some point during our sample period. Subsidized loans are typically capped at 100,000 or 500,000
Euros, have a term of five or ten years, have an interest rate that is more favorable than typical for a conventional bank loan, and may have repayment-free years.
7
Another advantage from the firm's perspective is that little to no collateral is required for the loan, leaving the bank with the loan default risk.
Outcome variables
public sector.
5
The ventures' sector affiliation is predefined, and it depends on its NACE code.
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This funding typically covers employee wages (about 2,500€-3,000€ per month) for a twelve-month period, in addition to material costs (about 30,000€) and training expenses (5,000€) (source: http://www.exist.de). 
Founder and venture characteristics
We compile a rich set of variables that we use to model the likelihood that a venture will receive any of the three treatments. The selection of control variables is based on documented funding criteria of public funding agencies, but also those of banks and other capital providers, which are presumably linked to a firm's expected success and its riskiness. A main factor of entrepreneurial business success and also a key criterion for funding agencies is the entrepreneur's human capital (Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Gimmon and Levie, 2010; Stucki, 2016) , that is, the stock of knowledge and capabilities that the entrepreneur can use.
Considering the undisputed relevance of human capital to external funding and business success, we incorporated several control variables that capture the human capital of high-tech entrepreneurs. We use the variable Uni, which takes the value of one, when at least one founder has a university degree, and zero otherwise. Another argument for including the entrepreneur's formal education as a control comes from Marvel and Lumpkin (2007) , who use a sample of 145 US technology entrepreneurs to find that innovation is positively associated with formal education. We also use the oldest founder's age (Age) as a control for accumulated human capital or simply life experience. Lerner et al. (1997) show that founders' industry experience increases the probability of receiving external financing and positively affects their ventures' performance. In addition, 8 We dropped observations whose ratios of R&D expenditures over sales or R&D employment over total employment were larger than 25, which corresponded to the largest 0.5 percent of the initial sample. Colombo and Grilli (2007) suggest that industry experience is a proxy for private wealth, reducing the venture's default risk and reliance on external financing. Therefore, we include the variable industry experience (Industry experience) as the most experienced founder's number of years working in the same industry.
In addition to industry experience that may have been gained through dependent employment, external capital providers appreciate entrepreneurial experience (e.g., Wright et al., 1997) , as entrepreneurs with prior founding experience have a stock of skills, knowledge, and social networks to cope with the challenges of founding and the capacity to exploit business opportunities (Delmar and Shane, 2006). To control for entrepreneurial experience, we use the binary indicator Entrepreneurial experience, which takes the value of one when at least one founder founded a venture before. However, as Hsu (2007) shows, external capital providers look not just for entrepreneurs with entrepreneurial experience but for those with successful experience, so we anticipate that negative entrepreneurial experience, such as the failure of a previous venture, might be penalized. Therefore, we use the binary variable Negative experience to capture whether the founder experienced bankruptcy with a previous firm.
Whether the venture is founded by a team or by a single entrepreneur may be another important criterion. Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990) argue that a large founding team comes with more and more diverse human capital, which facilitates multiple perspectives on the technology and better decisions. Other reasons to control for team founders include that, with a growing headcount, founding team members can specialize and tasks can be portioned out, including that of applying for public support, which is often bureaucratic and timeconsuming. Therefore, a larger team makes an application more likely. Another reason to control for an entrepreneurial team is the amount of internal funds that are likely to come with a large team, as internal funds can directly affect investment in R&D. The dummy variable
Team takes the value of one if the venture was founded by more than one person, and zero otherwise. As the last founder-specific variable, we control for the entrepreneur's gender, with the variable Female which takes value of one if at least one founding team member was female, and zero otherwise. Even though we do not expect that gender is a formal criterion for the allocation of public support, studies like that of Lins and Lutz (2016) indicate that the founder's gender does influence the receipt of external capital.
We further incorporate firm-specific information into the model. With the number of employees [ln(Employees)] we control for possible effects of size. Considering the skewed distribution, the variable enters in logarithms. We assume that firm size is likely to impact whether a venture will apply for and receive public support since larger firms usually have more resources with which to apply for them and because the granting institution might be too riskaverse to fund the R&D of very small firms that may not be able to attract sufficient staff quickly after the grant is received.
Another firm-specific control frequently mentioned in the literature is the age of the venture (Venture age). As younger ventures tend to be more financially constrained than their older counterparts, they may see a greater need to applying for subsidies and may also be more likely to receive public support measures that target new companies. Age may also capture how much the venture has learned since its founding. Because funding institutions that grant public support may follow a picking-the-winners strategy, we control for ventures' Revenue and Profit, both of which indicate the degree to which a business idea is working. On the other hand, ventures with higher revenues and especially profits are likely to be able to finance some of their R&D efforts internally, complementing the public money and increasing its efficacy.
As the chance that a venture will apply for public support increases with its propensity to perform R&D projects, we include three control variables that reflect the venture's technological and innovation profile. First, the variable Patent stock indicates the number of patents the venture had at time of founding, as we associate a higher number of patents with a higher innovative potential and with greater R&D experience and success. Second, the variable Export activity controls for the venture's export activities. Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2013) argue that firms that are engaged in foreign markets may face stronger pressure to innovate than others, which increases their need for financing and the chance that they will apply for subsidies. Huergo and Moreno (2017) also state that exporters face lower application costs, as they are more experienced with bureaucracy. Third, with the variable R&D activity we control for whether the company was active in R&D prior to applying for public support.
We also incorporate a variable for utilization of the venture's production capacity (Capacity utilization) to capture the venture's desire for expansion and, hence, the likelihood that it will seek public support. In addition, we include a control variable for location, which takes the value of one if it is located in eastern Germany and zero if it is located in western Germany. This variable takes into account the German government's initiative to support structural development in the eastern states, which may increase the likelihood that firms located there receive support (e.g., Liu and Rammer, 2016) 9 .
Finally, we include four sub-sector variables to account for differences in the sectors' technological opportunities and the preferences of public funding agencies for certain 9 Differences in funding probability are significant between East and West but not between states in the West or states in the East. technology fields, as well as year dummies that capture macroeconomic trends during the period of analysis.
Timing of the variables
When possible, we model the selection of one of the three types of subsidies in period t0 as a function of the founder's and venture's characteristics prior to t0. Some characteristics are timeinvariant, and others are observed in the same year as the receipt of a grant or no grant. The design of the selection stage is such that it resembles the situation of the venture right at the time of the subsidy decision. We consider outcome variables strictly after t0, that is, we forward the outcome variables to account for public subsidies' lagged "impulse effect" (if any) on firms' activities.
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Investments are an exception to that rule as we measure it in t0 because investments comprise one-off costs rather than expenditures occurring over a longer period of time, for instance in the case of wages for an R&D employee.
Because of the structure of the data, we model the firm's decision to apply for a subsidy and the funding agency's decision to grant support as a single step, thereby incorporating variables that affect both decisions simultaneously (e.g., Colombo, Croce et al., 2013; Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2013) . Both conceptually and technically, this procedure does not affect the matching estimator that is used to match ventures that are similar in their propensity to receive treatment. The propensity to receive the treatment is estimated based on a large set of characteristics, and we should not observe any differences between treated and untreated ventures in terms of these characteristics after matching. Differences in the outcome variable in t > t0 may then be attributed to the treatment. Table 1 shows that the potential control group of firm-year observations without any subsidies is by far the largest (3,302 observations), followed by the group of firm-year observations who received only a grant (738 observations), only a subsidized loan (202 observations), and both subsidies (145 observations). The observation of lagged and future values requires that we observe a venture in more than one year. The exclusion of ventures that appear only once may burden our data with a survivorship bias, but this occurs only if the one-time participation in the survey is due to a venture's bankruptcy. Such an exit was recorded for 13 percent of the firms in our sample. We would be worried if the probability of exit differed substantially between subsidized and non-subsidized ventures, but there are no considerable differences in exit probability between these groups (see Table 4a ). The group of subsidized ventures differs substantially from the group of non-subsidized ventures. Figure A. 2., which depicts employment growth for firms from the 2008-founding cohort, illustrates two issues: a large share of subsidized firms were subsidized in the first or second year of their life cycles, and the difference in firm size, as measured by the number of employees, becomes more pronounced over time. This second observation may not be due only to the subsidy but to differences in the characteristics of firms that are selected for support and those that are not. For instance, t-tests on mean differences show that founders who received a grant are, on average, less industry-experienced and were more likely to have had a negative founding experience than were founders who did not receive a subsidy. The two groups also differ with regard to firm-and location-specific characteristics. For example, ventures that received a grant are, on average, significantly younger, have more employees and higher revenues than are those that did not receive a grant. We also find structural differences when we compare the two other subsidized groups (subsidized loan versus grant + subsidized loan) with the group of non-subsidized ventures. Interestingly, there are little differences in venture age between treatment types suggesting that both grants and loans are received at similar stages of the firm's life cycles.
Descriptive statistics
The differences between subsidized and unsubsidized firms stress the importance of matching based on all these characteristics to obtain comparable groups of firms. Therefore we conclude that the groups' composition is not random, and we estimate a separate selection equation for each of the three types of treatment.
- Table 1 about here -
Econometric results
Estimation of the propensity scores
To apply the matching estimator described in chapter 3, we first estimate three probit models to obtain the predicted probability that a venture will receive a grant, a subsidized loan, or both during a period. Table 2 shows that, in all three models, the coefficients of most founder-, venture-, and location-specific characteristics are significantly different from zero.
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Hence, these characteristics drive the venture's selection into the funding program, so accounting for them in the selection stage reduces bias in the evaluation stage.
overrepresented in the IAB/ ZEW Start-Up Panel, so the relatively high number of high-tech ventures that received no public support indicates that the receipt is related to application costs and selective programs.
The overall rates of correct classifications are estimated to be 81.58% (grant), 94.18% (subsidized loan), and 95.82% (combination).
For the dependent variable subsidized loan (and for the combination of both a grant and a loan), we find that some of the variables that impact the funding decision are the same as those that impact grants, but we also see differences. For instance, the size of a venture impacts the likelihood that a venture will receive a loan, whereas variables that reflect the venture's technological and innovative profile do not.
- Table 2 about here - Tables 3a-3c show the outcome variables (and control variables) after the three matching processes. After the matching, all founder-and venture-related characteristics are balanced, so we conclude that our matching was successful and that we found a comparable non-subsidized neighbor for each subsidized observation. Therefore, differences for the outcome variables are not attributable to differences in these characteristics any longer and may be attributed to the treatment. 13 We find that the group of ventures that received a grant has, on average, higher R&D expenditures and more R&D employees than the matched group does (Table 3a) . This result also holds for the ratios of internal R&D expenditures to sales and R&D employment to total employment. The difference in R&D employees is equal to about one additional employee in the treatment group.
Estimation of treatment effects
The results for subsidized loans differ from those for grants, as the average values of the R&D-related and innovation-related variables for loan recipients are not significantly different from those of their non-subsidized counterparts (Table 3b ). This result confirms the idea that grants, rather than loans, are used to finance R&D projects, although we find that the loans treatment group's investment in tangible assets is higher than it is in the control group.
For the combination of both measures (grants & loans) we find higher R&D spending and higher R&D employment than in the control group and a significantly higher likelihood of innovation (60% versus 46%, see Table 3c ).
Next, we compare firms that received both grant and loan to those that received only the former. For this comparison, we re-do the matching procedure as described above, but draw
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The "common support" criterion (described in section 3) is necessary to ensure the validity of the matching estimators. In the matching process for grants, eight observations with grants are dropped from our analysis because we found no common support. Twelve treated observations are dropped because of the caliper we impose on the maximum distance between neighbors. Therefore, a total of twenty observations are deleted from the sample of firms with grants. In the matching process for subsidized loans, we dropped nine observations because of the caliper. We lost twenty-four observations in the matching process for the receipt of both kinds of public support. the control firms from the sample of "grant only" firms and consider recipients of both subsidy and grant as "treated". In this test, we hence focus exclusively on firms that received some form of public support which leads to a more homogenous sample. The new matching therefore accounts for differences between firms that apply to only one program and those that apply to both types. After matching there are no significant differences in the control variables between these groups. The results for the outcome variables show that grants combined with loans lead to a larger innovation likelihood compared to grants only despite similar levels of R&D. This is likely explained by the larger amount of tangible investments in the group of firms that received both. Finally, we see that recipients of both types of support benefit from their innovations as reflected in higher revenues compared to grant-only firms (see Table 3d ).
-Tables 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d about here -
Crowding out of private investment
Concerns about governmental financing of young firms refer to the crowding out of private capital, preventing the flourishing of a venture capital culture in Europe. Theoretical arguments, however, work in two directions: On one hand, public funding may step-in very early in a venture's life cycle, when investment is not attractive for venture capitalists, thus helping firms overcome the "valley of death" without compromising venture capital funding later on. On the other hand, venture capital funding that comes with voting rights and influence may no longer be attractive to founders if they have access to grants and inexpensive loans with few strings attached. Whether grants or subsidized loans are crowding out private equity investments and hampering the development of a vibrant venture capital market is an empirical question. We perform the matching procedure as described above to test whether subsided (but otherwise similar) ventures are less likely than unsubsidized ventures to receive equity investment.
14 If the receipt of grants or subsidized loans crowds out private equity investment, we expect the number of ventures that receive equity investment to be significantly lower for the group of subsidized ventures. However, contrary to this crowding-out hypothesis, we find no significant differences between the groups that receive a grant (mean value: 0.072) and those that receive a subsidized loan (mean value: 0.077) with their matched control groups (mean value: 0.075 and 0.093, respectively , see Table 4a ). For the group that received both a grant and subsidized 14 Alternatively, we construct a variable for firms that had ever received equity investments at any time since the venture's founding year because the presence of subsidy schemes could crowd out incentives to seek equity investors. loan compared to unsubsidized firms, we find a difference in the expected venture capital likelihood of 7.4. percentage points. , i.e. a larger mean value in the VC-measure for the former.
This finding corresponds to the observation from the SBIR program that subsidies can facilitate funding from external investors by financing early-stage product and process development (Howell, 2017) .
We also look at other changes in ownership, such as a merger with another company and acquisition by another company where we consider an acquisition as the takeover of the majority of shares by another company. Both types of events are rare in our sample and after matching, there are no significant differences in the likelihood of merger between nonsubsidized ventures and ventures subsidized by grants and both grants and loans. Recipients of only loans have a slightly lower merger probability, so mergers may be a way for nonsubsidized firms to overcome financial constraints (Table 4a ). Finally, we find a larger although weakly significant likelihood of business failure defined as the event of declaration of bankruptcy following the definition by (Gottschalk et al., 2017) for treated firms than for the untreated firms. This suggests that in our data, unlike in the study by Conti (2018) for Israeli firms, subsidies do not reduce the likelihood of failure per-se, perhaps because subsidized ventures tend to carry out riskier projects. The results may also vary due to the design of the subsidy programs in place which differ in terms of risk taking in case of project failure.
Finally, we compare differences between recipients of both types of support to those of grants only (Table 4b) . Here, we see that the former have indeed a lower bankruptcy probability and a higher -although not statistically significant -probability of venture capital financing later on.
- Tables 4a and 4b about here -
Robustness tests
To test the robustness of these results, we first sought to determine whether the main results change depending on the period investigated. The years after 2010 were characterized by low interest rates, which reduced lending costs. However, the effects of the treatments for the periods before and after 2010 are very similar. We furthermore tested the sensitivity of the results to excluding firms in eastern Germany, where structural economic differences persist, and found that the main results hold (detailed results available upon request).
Conclusion
This study focuses on the role of subsidies for new firms' performance. Public support is usually motivated by the social return these firms create by means of radical innovation, employment creation, and increased pressure on incumbents to innovate (Schneider and Veugelers, 2010) Moreover, recipients of grants and subsidized loans combined outperform grant-only recipients in terms of innovation performance and survival.
While we conclude that government-backed loans may not be a suitable tool for triggering risky R&D investments and that grants seem better suited to increase R&D spending, we also see that grants do not seem to suffice to achieve innovation. Even in times of low interest rates, young high-tech ventures benefit from the combined receipt of grants and loans.
That loans are used to finance tangible investments and to scale up production, rather than R&D, appears central to these firms' ability to successfully introduce new products and services to the market which trigger sales and lower the risk of bankruptcy.
These results are robust to variations of the matching estimator and are consistent throughout the period of analysis. We do not find support for the hypothesis that subsidy programs prevent firms from seeking financing from private investors; to the contrary, the receipt of grants increases the likelihood of acquisition and the receipt of venture capital. We cannot, however, conclude that public support has per-se beneficial effects on business survival, as the larger bankruptcy rate in the group of loan recipients suggests that funding programs target indeed riskier ventures whose project are enabled through the public support, but eventually still fail.
This study has several policy implications. First, it shows that incentivizing R&D activities may require financial support without repayment obligation. Second, it suggests that, since the amount of funding raised from grants is typically limited, access to loans can help new ventures finance product development, which eventually leads to the market introduction and scale-up of new product and service offers. Therefore, funding agencies should consider grants and loans, not as alternative policy tools, but as two elements of a successful start-up support policy. Third, our study does not confirm the idea that public support crowds out private sector investors. Funding through public support programs may precede private investments and, conditional on their survival, it may actually facilitate access to venture capital and make start-ups a more attractive target for acquisition.
Our study has some limitations that may be addressed in follow-on work. Future research would benefit from focusing on the longer-term effects on employment and sales growth of public subsidies, for which the present study found only small effects. Moreover, studying the effects of public subsidies on firms' survival rates and outcomes like initial public offerings or acquisition by larger companies in the longer run would be desirable. The most mature ventures in our sample are only seven years old, which may be too early to derive conclusions regarding the long-term effects of public start-up support. Finally, limited data availability means we did not investigate the effects of agglomeration economies in more detail, so studying the multiplier effects generated by regional characteristics and network effects would be useful. Previous research suggests that new technology-based firms benefit from spatial proximity to universities, suppliers, and customers (Audretsch et al., 2012; Guerrero et al., 2015; Fudickar and Hottenrott, 2018) , but it remains to be seen whether start-up support is more effective in regions where regional spillovers are weak or whether prospering regions amplify the effects of start-up support. 
